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Abstract. In ways analogous to humans, autonomous agents require
trust and reputation concepts in order to identify communities of agents
with which to interact reliably. This paper defines a class of attacks called
witness-based collusion attacks designed to exploit trust and reputation
models. Empirical results demonstrate that unidimensional trust models
are vulnerable to witness-based collusion attacks in ways independent
multidimensional trust models are not. This paper analyzes the impact
of the proportion of witness-based colluding agents on the society. Fur-
thermore, it demonstrates that here is a need for witness interaction trust
to detect colluding agents in addition to the need for direct interaction
trust to detect malicious agents. By proposing a set of policies, the pa-
per demonstrates how learning agents can decrease the level of encounter
risk in a witness-based collusive society.
1 Introduction
By analogy with human societies in which trust is one of the most crucial con-
cepts driving decision making and relationships, trust is indispensable when con-
sidering interactions among individuals in artiﬁcial societies such as are found in
e-commerce marketplaces. According to Jarvenpaa et al. [5], trust is an essential
aspect of any relationship in which the trustor does not have direct control over the
actions of a trustee, the decision is important, and the environment is uncertain.
We use the experience that we gain in interacting with others to judge how they
will perform in similar situations. However, when we need to assess our trust in
someone of whom we have no direct personal experience, we often ask others re-
garding their personal experience with this individual. This collective opinion of
others regarding the speciﬁc individual is known as an individual’s reputation.
As reputation and trust have recently received considerable attention in many
diverse domains several deﬁnitions exist. Mui et al. deﬁne trust as “a subjective
expectation an agent has about another’s future behavior based on the history
of their encounters” [8]. While trust deﬁnitions focus more on the history of
agents’ encounters, reputation is based on the aggregated information from other
individuals. For instance, Sabater and Sierra [10] declared that “reputation is
the opinion or view of someone about something”.
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Sabater and Sierra [11] categorized computational trust and reputation models
based on various intrinsic features. From their perspective, a trust and reputation
model can be cognitive or game-theoretical in terms of its conceptual model.
Trust and reputation models might use diﬀerent sources of information such as
direct experiences, witness information, sociological information and prejudice.
Direct experience and witness information are pertinent to this paper. Direct
experiences deal with agent-to-agent interactions while witness information is
information that comes from members of the community about others. Trust
and reputation models vary in terms of individual behavior assumptions; in
some models, cheating behaviors and malicious individuals are not considered at
all whereas in others possible cheating behaviors are taken into account. There
are many computational models of trust, a review of which can be found in [11].
Regret [10] is a decentralized trust and reputation system oriented to e-
commerce environments. The system takes into account three diﬀerent sources of
information: direct experiences, information from third party agents and social
structures. Yu and Singh [16] developed an approach for social reputation man-
agement, in which they represented an agent’s ratings regarding another agent
as a scalar and combined them with testimonies using combination schemes
similar to certainty factors. Huynh et al. [4] introduced a trust and reputation
model called FIRE that incorporates interaction trust, role-based trust, witness
reputation, and certiﬁed reputation to provide a trust metric.
Most recently, researchers have identiﬁed the existence of cheaters (exploita-
tion) in artiﬁcial societies employing trust and reputation models [6,12], and the
existence of inaccurate witnesses [15,2], and [17]. Kerr and Cohen [6] examined
the security of several e-commerce marketplaces employing a trust and repu-
tation system. To this end, they proposed several attacks and examined their
eﬀects on each marketplace. Unfortunately, Kerr and Cohen assume that buyers
are honest in the witness information provided to one another and consequently
do not consider collusion attacks. Salehi-Abari and White [12] introduced and
formally modeled the con-man attack and demonstrated the vulnerability of
several trust models against this attack. This work also did not consider any
collusion attacks.
There are few trust models which consider the existence of an adversary in
providing witness information and present solutions for dealing with inaccurate
reputation. TRAVOS [14] models an agent’s trust in an interaction partner. Trust
is calculated using probability theory that takes account of past interactions and
reputation information gathered from third parties while coping with inaccurate
reputations. Yu and Singh [17] is similar to TRAVOS, in that it rates opinion
source accuracy based on a subset of observations of trustee behavior.
To our knowledge, there is no formal model of witness-based collusion and
analysis of the level of encounter risk for trust-aware agents in witness-based
collusive societies. In a witness-based collusion attack, an unreliable witness
provider in spite of being cooperative in its direct interactions provides high
ratings for other malicious agents (other members of the colluding group), thus
resulting in motivating the victim agent to interact with them. This lack of
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study on witness-based collusion attacks motivates the work reported in this
paper. This paper expands on a preliminary workshop paper [13].
Our contributions include the introduction of witness-based collusion attacks;
a formal agent-based model of this attack class; an analysis of the impact of this
attack class on agent societies, and on the level of encounter risk for trust-aware
individuals; and a proposal for strategies of trust-aware agents to deal with this
attack class.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Before describing the Witness-
based Collusion Attack in Section 3, we discuss the environment model of agents
in Section 2. We describe the agentmodel in Section 4, and experiments in Section
5. Finally, conclusions and future work are explained in Section 6.
2 Environment Model
The majority of open distributed computer systems can be modeled as multi-
agent systems (MAS) in which each agent acts autonomously to achieve its
objectives. Autonomy is represented here by the evaluation of policies that cause
changes in agent trust and reputation models and subsequent changes in societal
structure. Our model incorporates heterogeneous agents interacting in a game
theoretic manner. The model is described in the following 3 subsections.
2.1 Interactions
An agent interacts with a subset of all agents that are the neighbors of the given
agent. Two agents are neighbors if both accept each other as a neighbor and in-
teract with one another continuously. An agent maintains the neighborhood set
which is dynamic, changing when an agent is determined to be untrustworthy
or new agent interactions are required. Agents have bounded sociability as de-
termined by the maximal cardinality of the neighborhood set. Agents can have
two types of interactions with their neighbors: Direct Interaction and Witness
Interaction.
Direct Interaction. Direct interaction is the most frequently used source of
information for trust and reputation models [11,9]. Diﬀerent ﬁelds have their
own interpretation of direct interaction. For example, in e-commerce, direct in-
teraction might be considered to be buying or selling a product, whereas in ﬁle
sharing systems direct interaction is ﬁle exchange.
Witness Interaction. An agent can ask for an assessment of the trustworthi-
ness of a speciﬁc agent from its neighbors and then the neighbors send their
ratings of that agent to the asking agent. We call this asking for an opinion and
receiving a rating, a Witness Interaction.
2.2 Games: IPD and GPD
Direct and witness interactions are modeled using two extensions of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma. The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a non-zero-sum, non-cooperative, and simul-
taneous game in which two players may each “cooperate” with or “defect” from
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the other player. In the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) [1], the game is played
repeatedly. As a result, players have the opportunity to “punish” each other for
previous uncooperative play. The IPD is closely related to the evolution of trust
because if both players trust each other they can both cooperate and avoidmutual
defection. We have modeled the direct interaction using IPD.
Witness Interaction is modeled by the Generalized Prisoner’s Dilemma (GPD).
GPD is a two-person game which speciﬁes the general forms for an asymmetric
payoﬀ matrix that preserves the social dilemma [3]. GPD is compatible with
client/server structure where one player is the client and the other one is the
server in each game. The decision of the server alone determines the ultimate
outcome of the interaction.
2.3 Cooperation and Defection
We deﬁne two kinds of Cooperation and Defection in our environment:
(1) Cooperation/Defection in Direct Interaction (CDI/DDI) and (2) Cooper-
ation/Defection in Witness Interaction (CWI/DWI).
CDI/DDI have diﬀerent interpretations depending on the context. For exam-
ple, in e-commerce, defection in an interaction can be interpreted as the agent
not satisfying the terms of a contract, selling poor quality goods, delivering late,
or failing to pay the requested amount of money to a seller [9]. CWI means
that the witness agent provides a reliable rating for the asking agent regarding
the queried agent. In contrast, DWI means that the witness agent provides an
unreliable rating for the asker agent regarding the queried agent.
3 Witness-Based Collusion Attack
Collusion can be deﬁned as a collaborative activity that gives to members of a
colluding group beneﬁts they would not be able to gain as individuals. Collusion
attacks occur when one or more agents conspire together to take advantage of
breaches in trust models to defraud one or more agents. It can be the case that
agents in the colluding group adopt a sacriﬁcial stance in collusion attacks in
order to maximize the utility of the colluding group.
Collusion attacks often work based on the basic idea that one or more agents
show themselves as trustworthy agents in one type of interaction (usually direct
interaction). Afterward, they will be untrustworthy in other type of interaction
(e.g., witness interaction) by providing false information in favor of other mem-
bers of the colluding group. This false information usually encourages a victim
to interact with members of the colluding group. The members of the colluding
group will cheat the victim, if victim interacts with them.
As depicted in Figure 1, we formally deﬁne three roles in the Witness-based
Collusion Attack: victim agent, enticer agent, and malicious agent. Enticer agents
and malicious agents form the colluding group to exploit victim agents. The en-
ticer agents show themselves trustworthy in direct interactions to victim agents
and consequently they become trustworthy neighbors of victim agents. After-
ward, when victim agents are looking for ratings (reputation) of malicious agent
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Victim Agent
Malicious Agent
Enticer Agent
Fig. 1. Witness-based Collusion Attack
by asking from their trustworthy neighbors, the enticer agents provide high rat-
ings for malicious agents (other members of the colluding group) in order to
encourage the victim agents to interact with them, and consequently the victim
agents will be exploited by them. The dashed line in Figure 1 shows the start of
interaction of a victim agent with a malicious agent as a result of high ratings
provided by enticer agents.
It can be observed that when the victim agent bases its assessment of witness
information on the cooperations (trustworthiness) in direct interactions, this
attack will be successful. In particular, the success of this attack is the result of
the inappropriate assumption that whoever is cooperative (trustworthy) in direct
interactions will be cooperative (trustworthy) in providing witness information
regarding other agents.
It is the hypothesis of this paper that the Witness-based Collusion Attack can
be prevented if the asker agent utilizes an independent multi-dimensional trust
model. In this sense, the asker agent will assess the witness providers based on
their cooperations in witness interactions.
4 Agent Model
This section presents two types of trust variables and a type of reputation vari-
able that assist agents in determining with whom they should interact. Fur-
thermore, three policy types will be presented: direct interaction policy, witness
interaction policy, and connection policy which assist agents in deciding how and
when they should interact with another agent.
4.1 Trust Variables
Based on the aforementioned cooperation/defection explained in section 2.3, two
modeled dimensions of trust are proposed. The motivation for having two trust
variables is that we believe trustworthiness has diﬀerent independent dimensions.
For instance, an agent who is trustworthy in a direct interaction is not necessarily
trustworthy in a witness interaction.
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Each trust variable is deﬁned by Ti,j(t) indicating the trust rating assigned
by agent i to agent j after t interactions between agent i and agent j, while
Ti,j(t) ∈ [−1,+1] and Ti,j(0) = 0. One agent in the view of the other agent can
have one of the following levels of trustworthiness: Trustworthy, Not Yet Known,
or Untrustworthy. Following Marsh [7], we deﬁne an upper and a lower threshold
for each agent to model diﬀerent levels of trustworthiness. The agent i has its
own upper threshold −1 ≤ ωi ≤ 1 and lower threshold −1 ≤ Ωi ≤ 1. Agent j is
Trustworthy from the viewpoint of agent i after t times of interactions if and only
if Ti,j(t) ≥ ωi. Agent i sees agent j as an Untrustworthy agent if Ti,j(t) ≤ Ωi
and if Ωi < Ti,j(t) < ωi then the agent j is in the state Not Yet Known.
Direct Interaction Trust (DIT). Direct Interaction Trust (DIT) is the result
of CDI/DDI. Each agent maintains DITi,j(t) variables for the agents with which
they have had direct interactions. We used the following trust updating scheme
motivated by that described in [16]:
if DITi,j(t) > 0 and CDI then
DITi,j(t + 1) = DITi,j(t) + αD(i)(1−DITi,j(t))
if DITi,j(t) < 0 and CDI then
DITi,j(t + 1) = (DITi,j(t) + αD(i))/(1−min(|DITi,j(t))| , |αD(i)|)
if DITi,j(t) > 0 and DDI then
DITi,j(t + 1) = (DITi,j(t) + βD(i))/(1 −min(|DITi,j(t))| , |βD(i)|)
if DITi,j(t) < 0 and DDI then
DITi,j(t + 1) = DITi,j(t) + βD(i)(1 + DITi,j(t))
Where αD(i) > 0 and βD(i) < 0 are positive evidence and negative evidence
weighting coeﬃcients respectively for updating of the direct interaction trust
variable of agent i. The value of DITi,j(t), ωDITi and Ω
DIT
i determine that the
agent j is either trustworthy, Not Yet Known or Untrustworthy in terms of direct
interaction from the perspective of agent i.
Witness Interaction Trust (WIT). Witness InteractionTrust (WIT) is the re-
sult of the cooperation/defection that the neighbors of an agent havewith the agent
regarding witness interaction (CWI/DWI). Agent i maintains a WITi,j(t) vari-
able for the agent j from whom it has received witness information. The updating
scheme of WITi,j(t) is similar to the one presented for DITi,j(t) but CDI and DDI
should be replaced by CWI and DWI respectively and αD(i) > 0 and βD(i) < 0
is replaced with αW (i) > 0 and βW (i) < 0 respectively. Where αW (i) > 0 and
βW (i) < 0 are positive evidence and negative evidence weighting coeﬃcients
respectively for updating of the witness interaction trust variable of agent i.
The value of WITi,j(t), ωWITi and Ω
WIT
i determine that the agent j is either
Trustworthy, Not Yet Known or Untrustworthy in terms of witness interaction.
4.2 Witness-Based Reputation (WR)
As agents need to predict the trustworthiness of those agents with whom they
have never interacted, we use witness-based reputation (WR) for predicting
trustworthiness of these agents. This reputation is calculated based on the wit-
ness information received from the neighbors.
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Witness-based reputation for a speciﬁc agent is calculated based on the ratings
of other agents. The asking agent stores the ratings of other agents in an Opinion
variable. Opinion(j, k) shows the rating issued by agent j regarding agent k. WR
of agent k from the perspective of agent i after reception of t opinions (ratings) is
denoted by WRi,k(t) and can be calculated by either Equation 1 or Equation 2:
WRi,k(t) =
∑
j∈OpinionSenders (φ(DITi,j)×Opinion(j, k))∑
j∈OpinionSenders φ(DITi,j)
(1)
WRi,k(t) =
∑
j∈OpinionSenders (φ(WITi,j)×Opinion(j, k))∑
j∈OpinionSenders φ(WITi,j)
(2)
In both formulae, the OpinionSenders variable includes indices of the neighbors
of agent i who sent their ratings about agent k and WITi,j is the current value
of WIT variable of agent j from the perspective of agent i. Note that, φ(r) is a
converter function that is calculated by Equation 3.
φ(r) =
{ 0 −1 ≤ r < Ω
r−Ω
ω−Ω Ω ≤ r ≤ ω
1 ω ≤ 1
(3)
The value of WRi,k(t), ωWRi and Ω
WR
i determine that the agent k is either
Trustworthy, Not Yet Known or Untrustworthy in terms of witness-based repu-
tation from the perspective of agent i.
4.3 Agent Policy Types
The perceptions introduced above allow agents to determine the trustworthiness
of other agents. Policies make use of agent perceptions, trust and reputation
models in order to decide upon the set of agents with which they will interact
and in what ways they will interact. Policies may cause the agent interaction
neighborhood to change, for example. Several policy classes have been deﬁned
for the research reported here; they are explained in the following subsections.
Direct Interaction Policy (DIP). This type of policy assists an agent in
making decisions regarding its direct interactions.
Witness Interaction Policy (WIP). This type of policy exists to aid an agent
in making three categories of decisions related to its witness interactions. First,
agents should decide how to provide the witness information for another agent
on receiving a witness request. Should they manipulate the real information and
forward false witness information to the requester (an example of defection) or
should they tell the truth? The second decision made by the Witness Interac-
tion Policy is related to when and from whom the agent should ask for witness
information. Should the agents ask for the witness information when it has a
connection request from an unknown party? Should the agents ask for witness
information from a subset or all of its neighbors? The third decision is on how
agents should aggregate the received ratings. For example, should the agent
calculate the simple average of ratings or a weighted average of ratings?
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We deﬁned three sub witness interaction policies: Answering Policy (AP),
Querying Policy (QP), and Information-Gathering policy (IGP). Answering Pol-
icy intends to cover the the ﬁrst category of decisions mentioned above while
Querying Policy and Information-Gathering policy apply to the second and third
categories respectively.
Connection Policy (CP). This policy type assists an agent in making decisions
regarding whether it should make a request for connection to other agents and
whether the agents should accept/reject a request for a connection.
4.4 Experimentally Evaluated Policies
This section described policies that were evaluated experimentally.
Direct Interaction Policies. Three kinds of DIPs used in our experiments
are: Always Cooperate (AC), Always-Defect (AD), and Trust-based Tit-For-Tat
(TTFT). Agents using the AC policy for their direct interactions will cooper-
ate with their neighbors in direct interactions regardless of the action of their
neighbor. In contrast, agents using the AD policy will defect in all neighbor
interactions. Agents employing TTFT will start with cooperation and then im-
itate the neighbors’ last move as long as the neighbors are neither trustworthy
nor untrustworthy. If a neighbor is known as untrustworthy, the agent will de-
fect and immediately disconnect from that neighbor. If a neighbor is known as
trustworthy, the agent will cooperate with it.
Connection Policy. Three kinds of connection polices used in our experiments
are: Conservative (C), Naive (N), and Greedy (G). There is an internal property
for each of these policies called Socializing Tendency (ST) which aﬀects deci-
sions regarding making connection requests and the acceptance of a connection
request. Both Naive and Greedy policies use Algorithm 1 with diﬀerent values
for ST.
According to Algorithm 1, any connection request from another agent will
be accepted regardless of ST value but the agent will attempt to connect to
unknown agents if its number of neighbors is less than ST.
Algorithm 1. Greedy and Naive Policies
1: {CRQ is a queue containing the connection requests}
2: if CRQ is not empty then
3: j = dequeue(CRQ)
4: connectTo(j)
5: end if
6: if size(neighborhood) < ST then
7: j = get unvisited agent from list of all known agents
8: if ∃j = null then
9: requestConnectionTo(j)
10: end if
11: end if
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Algorithm 2. Conservative Connection Policy
1: if CAQ is not empty then
2: j = dequeue(CAQ)
3: connectTo(j)
4: end if
5: if size(neighborhood) < ST then
6: if SIQ is not empty then
7: j = dequeue(SIQ)
8: else
9: if CRQ is not empty then
10: j = dequeue(CRQ)
11: else
12: j = get unvisited agent from list of all known agents
13: end if
14: end if
15: if ∃j = null then
16: connectTo(j)
17: end if
18: end if
19: if CRQ is not empty then
20: j = dequeue(CRQ)
21: enque(SIQ,j)
22: end if
Using the Conservative policy presented in Algorithm 2, the agents connect to
conﬁrmed agents regardless of the number of their neighbors. CAQ contains the
list of agent IDs conﬁrmed; this conﬁrmation of an agent might be accomplished
by a witness interaction policy. If the number of neighbors is less than ST, the
agent connects to the agents requested for connections or to an unvisited agent.
Finally, if there are any agent IDs in CRQ (a queue of connection requests), the
ﬁrst agent ID will be inserted in SIQ (a list of agents whose reputations should
be investigated).
We set the value of ST 5, 25, and 100 for Conservative, Naive, and Greedy
connection policies respectively.
Algorithm 3. Answering Policy
1: if receiving a witness request about j from k then
2: opinion = ∗
3: send opinion to k
4: if |opinion −DITi,j(t)| < DT then
5: Send CWI to k after TW time steps
6: else
7: Send DWI to k after TW time steps
8: end if
9: end if
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Witness Interaction Policy. Three kinds of answering policies are modeled:
Honest (Ho), Liar (Li), and Misleader (Mi). All these sub-policies use the pseudo-
code presented in Algorithm 3 while diﬀerentiating in the assignment of opinion
variable (refer to * in Algorithm 3). The asterisk should be replaced by DITi,j(t),
“−1∗DITi,j(t)”, or 1 for Honest, Liar, or Misleader policy respectively. An agent
employing the Liar policy gives manipulated ratings to other agents by giving
high ratings for untrustworthy agents and low ratings for trustworthy ones. The
Misleader policy ranks all other agents as trustworthy but the Honest policy
always tells the truth to everyone. CWI/DWI will be sent based on whether
the forwarding opinion agrees with the internal trust value of an agent or not.
If the diﬀerence between them is less than the Discrimination Threshold (DT),
an agent will send CWI otherwise DWI is sent. We can therefore say that:
Liar always defects, Honest always cooperates, and Misleader sometimes defects
(by rating high untrustworthy agents) and sometimes cooperates (by rating low
trustworthy agents) in providing the witness information. In the experiments
reported here DT is set to 0.25.
Using the Querying Policy presented in Algorithm 4, the agents ask for witness
information from their neighbors regarding agents which are in the SIQ queue.
SIQ contains a list of agents whose reputations should be investigated. After
asking for witness information regarding a speciﬁc agent, the ID of that agent
is inserted in the WIFQ queue. WIFQ contains the list of agents waiting for the
Algorithm 4. Querying Policy
1: if SIQ is not empty then
2: k = dequeue(SIQ)
3: for all j ∈ Neighborhood do
4: Ask for witness information about k from j
5: end for
6: enque(WFIQ, k)
7: end if
8: for all k ∈ WFIQ do
9: if WRi,k > ω
WR
i then
10: enque(CAQ, k)
11: remove(WFIQ, k)
12: else
13: if WRi,k < Ω
WR
i then
14: remove(WFIQ, k)
15: else
16: if ShouldBeReInvestigated(k) then
17: for all j ∈ Neighborhood do
18: Ask for witness information about k from j
19: end for
20: end if
21: end if
22: end if
23: end for
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result of an investigation. If an agent in the WIFQ is known as trustworthy in the
context of WR, then the ID of that agent will be added to CAQ which contains
the list of conﬁrmed agents. The agents known as untrustworthy in terms of WR
will be removed from WIFQ. If an agent in WIFQ is known neither as trustwor-
thy nor as untrustworthy and the primitive ShouldBeReInvestigated(k) returns
a true value, then again the agent will request witness information from their
neighbors regarding the given agent (the agent k). This primitive can be eas-
ily implemented relying on whether agent k remains in WIFQ for more than a
speciﬁc amount of time.
We have speciﬁed two information-gathering policies: DIT-based Weighted
(DTW), and WIT-based Weighted (WTW). Both use Algorithm 5 while diﬀer-
entiating in the calculation of WRi,k (refer to * in Algorithm 5). DTW calculate
it by using the formula presented in the Equation 1, Whereas WTW use the
formula presented in the Equation 2.
Algorithm 5. Information-Gathering Policy
1: {Suppose that agent i is executing this code}
2: if receiving opinion about k from j then
3: Calculate WRi,k(t) based on *
4: end if
5 Experiments
We have empirically analyzed our agent types at both microscopic and macro-
scopic levels. On the macro level, we studied how society structure changes over
the course of many interactions. On the micro level, the utility of agents and the
number of dropped connections are examined. UAT (i), the average of utilities
for agents with the type of AT at time step i, is calculated by:
UAT (i) =
∑
a∈AT UAvg(a, i)
NAT
(4)
where UAvg(a, i) is the average of utility of agent a over its interactions at time
step i and NAT is the total number of agents in the society whose type is AT .
The utility of each interaction is calculated as follows: If agent i defects and
agent j cooperates, agent i gets the Temptation to Defect payoﬀ of 5 points
while agent j receives the Sucker’s payoﬀ of 0. If both cooperate each gets the
Reward for Mutual Cooperation payoﬀ of 3 points, while if both defect each gets
the Punishment for Mutual Defection payoﬀ of 1 point.
DAT (i), the average of dropped connections for agents with the type of AT
at time step i, is calculated by:
DAT (i) =
∑
a∈AT Dtotal(a, i)
NAT
(5)
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where Dtotal(a, i) is the total number of connections broken for agent a from the
start time to time step i and NAT is total number of agents of society whose
type are AT .
We have modeled the witness-based collusion attacks by using Enticer and
Malicious agents as explained in Section 3. In addition to these two types of
agents, the agent society includes Trust-Aware agents which are equipped with
perception variables (trust and reputation variables) to assess trustworthiness
of others and with policies to properly interact with others. We have deﬁned
two classes of Trust-Aware agents for our experiments: Trust-Aware (TAw) and
Trust-Aware+ (TA+w) where TAw uses a unidimensional trust model as opposed
to TA+w which uses a multi-dimensional trust model. Table 1 presents all agent
types used for all experiments.
Experiment 1. We have run two simulations of 200 agents for this experi-
ment. In the ﬁrst simulation, which models a non-collusive society, TAw agents
comprise 75% of the population and the rest are Malicious agents (for our con-
venience, we refer to this simulation as Sim1). The second simulation represents
the witness-based collusive society in which Enticer and Malicious agents com-
prise 5% and 20% of the populations respectively and the rest are TAw agents
(for our convenience, we refer to this simulation as Sim2). The objective of this
experiment is to understand the eﬀect of a witness-based collusion attack on the
structure of agent society and on the level of encounter risk. Encounter risk is
deﬁned to be linearly related to the average number of dropped connections.
Table 1. Agent Types and Specifications
Name Enticer Malicious TAw TA
+
w
Trust - - DIT DIT&WIT
DIP AC AD TTFT TTFT
CP N G C C
AP Mi Li Ho Ho
QP - - QP QP
IGP - - DTW WTW
(a) Non-collusive Society (b) Collusive Society
Fig. 2. The Final Society Structure in Exp. 1
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The structures of the agent society after 400 time steps for Sim1 and Sim2 are
presented in Figure 2 where TAw agents and Malicious agents are in green (light
gray in white-black print) and in black respectively. Red squares with white “-”
represent Enticer agents. In non-collusive societies as shown in Figure 2a, we
have two isolated groups of TAw and Malicious agents. In the witness-based
collusive society (see Figure 2b), we could not achieve separation of Malicious
and TAw agents seen in Sim1. Since TAw agents perceived Enticer agents as
trustworthy agents in direct interaction so they maintain their connections with
Enticer agents. As illustrated in Figure 2b, TAw agents are connected indirectly
to Malicious agents by means of Enticer agents while acting a buﬀer between
the Malicious agents and TAw agents.
Figure 3 illustrates D of TAw over the course of two simulations of Sim1
and Sim2. TAw agents in Sim1 (non-collusive society) have considerably fewer
dropped connections when compared to the TAw agents in Sim2 (witness-based
collusive society). In this sense, TAw agents expose themselves to higher level
of risk of being exploited by malicious agents in Sim2 as a result of ongoing
witness-based attacks, when compared to Sim1. This high level of risk is due
to the fact that each TAw agent is surrounded by Enticer agents, resulting in
receiving more manipulated opinions about other malicious agents while the
senders of all opinions are trustworthy in terms of direct interactions.
Experiment 2. We have run two simulations of 200 agents for this experiment,
in each of which Enticer, Malicious agents are 5% and 20% of the populations
respectively. The remainder of the population (75%) is either TAw or TA+w. Both
TAw and TA+w beneﬁt from using the Conservative connection policy and witness
interaction policies for inquiring about the trustworthiness of the connection
requester from neighbors. Note that, these two types employ various witness
information-gathering policies and diﬀerent trust models. TAw utilizes a uni-
dimensional trust model (i.e., DIT), whereas TA+w utilizes a multi-dimensional
trust model (i.e., DIT and WIT).
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This experiment is intended to demonstrate the beneﬁt of using multi-
dimensional trust where there are witness-based collusion attacks. More pre-
cisely, the intention behind this experiment is to show that TA+w agents by us-
ing multi-dimensional trust and appropriate witness interaction policies (e.g.,
WTW) can decrease the impact of Enticer and Malicious agents (colluding
groups) on aggregating the reputation ratings. As a result, the TA+w agents can
decide more reliably regarding the trustworthiness of other agents and expose
themselves to a lower level of risk.
As shown in Figure 4, TA+w agents have considerably fewer dropped connec-
tions when compared to TAw. Policies used by this agent type result in successful
acceptance/rejection of connection requests. In this sense, TA+w agents expose
themselves to smaller numbers of untrustworthy agents and consequently lower
the level of risk of being exploited by these agents.
Figure 5 illustrates U for TAw and TA+w types over the course of the simula-
tions. U reaches the value of 3 faster for TA+w than TAw and will not fall below
it later. This is evidence of the learning capability of TA+w agents especially by
using WIT for aggregating opinions in witness interaction policies. Each TA+w
agent, by updating WIT, will learn which of its neighbors are trustworthy in
terms of witness information and then weight their opinions based on their WIT
which is completely independent of DIT. As a result, false opinions of neighbors
cannot mislead them several times whereas TAw agents can be deceived several
times by false opinions from the same neighbors (Enticer agents) because of the
lack of this trust dimension.
Experiment 3. This experiment intends to show the eﬀect of population pro-
portion of Enticer agents on the eﬃcacy of Witness-based collusion attacks and
on the robustness of TAw and TA+w . We have run 2 sets of 4 simulations. Each
set consists of 200 agents with diﬀerent proportions of Enticer and Malicious
agents while keeping the proportion of either TAw or TA+w agents unchanged as
shown in Table 2. The simulations are run for 400 time steps.
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Table 2. Population Distributions of Experiment 3
Agent Type Population
Pop1 Pop2 Pop3 Pop4
Malicious 20% 15% 10% 5%
Naive 5% 10% 15% 20%
TAw or TA
+
w 75% 75% 75% 75%
Figure 6 presents D of each agent type at time step 400 for each of the runs.
By increasing the proportion of Enticer agents (i.e., decreasing the proportion
of Malicious agents), the D of TAw and TA+w will be decreased. Moreover, it
can be observed that in all runs the number of dropped connection for TAw is
greater when compared with the number of dropped connections of TA+w. This
is evidence of the fact that TA+w has better robustness against this attack.
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6 Conclusion
Witness-based collusion attacks degrade the value of DIT in trust-aware agent
societies. In these attacks, agents which are trustworthy in their direct interac-
tions, collude with malicious agents by providing a good rating for them. We
experimentally show how a unidimensional trust model is vulnerable against
witness-based collusion attacks. This vulnerability results in TAw agents, which
use a unidimensional trust model to weight the ratings, exposing themselves to a
higher level of encounter risk. Furthermore, TA+w agents, by using WIT, weight
the rating of Enticer agents and decrease the impact of them in their ﬁnal as-
sessment. This results in exposing themselves to a lower level of risk in their
interactions. We empirically demonstrate that the eﬃcacy of TA+w over TAw is
better for diﬀerent population proportions of Enticer and Malicious agents. Fi-
nally, we conclude multi-dimensionality is a crucial factor for resistance against
witness-based collusion attacks.
Collusion attacks are an emerging area of research in trust and reputations
systems. Future work will uncover new classes of such attacks and ways in which
they can be defeated.
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